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❧ Introduction 
When presented with the term ‘inhuman’, I was drawn 
to consider how certain ways of being become associated 
with the inhuman, how this association is involved in 
the constitution of what is taken as properly human, and 
the deleterious effects for those who become associated 
with the inhuman. I’m going to address these topics in 
three stages. First, I’ll briefly sketch how common 
understandings of disability might be thought of as 
‘dehumanising’. Next, I’ll outline why I think that 
appeals to the category of the human are inapt as a 
response to such dehumanization. Finally, I will point 
towards an alternative, positive sense of the inhuman. 
 
❧ The Inhuman as Dehumanisation 
Inhuman can denote that something dehumanises, or 
that it lies outside the human. In the first sense, 
inhuman could refer to the kind of objectifying gaze 
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posited by Merleau-Ponty, one that denudes another’s 
meaningfulness, thereby to preclude the understanding 
necessary for an ethical human relation.1 Initially, this 
seems to have some promise for conceptualisation of 
disability experience. Disability theorists note how a 
prevalent way of framing anomalous bodies and minds is 
a diagnostic medical gaze, that reduces an individual to 
their ostensible pathology.2 Significantly, this modality 
operates well beyond its jurisdiction to inform folk 
conceptions, that also operate through a prism of 
objectification. This produces what we might call 
anticipatory perceptual norms about what is a complete 
or correct human embodiment: to encounter bodily 
anomaly is to see divergence from a purportedly 
objective species normality. Disabled experience is 
reduced to abnormal bodily properties and their 
supposedly harmful entailments. We might say this 
renders disabled people doubly inhuman: first, by over-
identification with their purported divergence from the 
human; second, by how the attendant reduction to 
bodily properties hampers an ethical encounter. 
 
                                               
1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald 
Landes (London: Routledge, 2012). 
2. Michael Oliver, The Politics of Disablement (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1990). 
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❧ The Problem of the Human 
That this is called inhuman—where inhuman means 
dehumanising—might imply that a corrective would 
recognise disabled people within a common humanity. 
Where disability is concerned, however, this concept 
warrants scepticism. Ideas about the human—what it is, 
what it does, what it ought to be and do—are ubiquitous: 
they saturate the intersubjective lifeworld to condition 
everyday perception and action.3 
While this makes the human seem like simply part of 
the furniture of the world, it is not given but must be 
produced. Samatha Frost calls it an “implicitly 
comparative category”.4 While candidate ideas for what 
distinguishes humanness vary—intellection, autonomy, 
capacity for moral deliberation—these have a common 
thread. In each, some distinctively human characteristic 
separates it from other living beings. To be understood 
as self-sovereign, or as a moral agent, the human must 
be differentiated from inhuman dimensions: nonhuman 
organisms, the material world, its own ‘mere’ bodily 
                                               
3. Roberto Esposito, Persons and Things: From the Body’s Point of View 
(London: Polity, 2015). 
4. Samantha Frost, Biocultural Creatures: Toward a New Theory of the 
Human (London: Duke University Press, 2016), 8. 
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aspects (including basic functions and desires).5 It 
coheres through a “movement of differentiation” from, 
or repudiation of, those dimensions.6 
 
❧ Humanism and Disability 
Importantly, one never simply is human: to be human is 
to be validated as such. We need not mention the 
egregious failures of this designation to realise that what 
counts as human is not always self-evident, and that the 
concept can co-exist with instances of qualified 
humanity:7 those said to lack some characteristic 
possessed by the fully and properly human, and in virtue 
of which the latter can transcend their mere biological 
nature. The category of the human, then, can be just as 
reductive and objectifying as dehumanisation. 
This brings us to disability. I’m going to talk about 
autonomy, an important marker of humanness. If 
autonomy involves transcendence and appropriation of 
                                               
5. The mobility of this category is demonstrated when some nonhuman 
animal demonstrates a capacity hitherto thought to be solely the 
province of humans, whereupon that same property is no longer said 
to be a definitive marker of human/animal difference. 
6. Frost, Biocultural Creatures, 7. 
7. It does bear mentioning that humanitas is a central organising category 
for twentieth century theorists of racial hygiene. Roberto Esposito, 
“Biopolitics and Philosophy,” in Terms of the Political: Community, 
Immunity, Biopolitics (Rochester: Fordham University Press, 2012). 
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merely organismic dimensions, falling short of this ideal 
leaves one more or less “trapped in and by the body”.8 
Whether or not this is philosophically persuasive, it does 
line up with a common story about disability. While a 
disabled person may be human in principle, to be 
disabled is to be subject to some biological condition that 
diminishes the (purported) human power to transcend 
mere bodily demands and engage in free activity. If the 
human is defined by transcendence of the biological, 
disability inclines in equal measure towards the brute 
body and away from the properly human. In this 
account, the disabled body drags the human away from 
freedom and back towards material objectivity. 
 
❧ (In)humanisation 
I said that the human isn’t given but produced—as 
Merleau-Ponty suggests, “man is a historical idea and 
not a natural kind”9—and that this production has 
competing conceptions. The human, I instead suggest, is 
not defined by transcendence of supposedly inhuman 
dimensions. The human no more transcends the body 
than the body transcends the world. Taking this a step 
further, this body is embedded and constituted within 
                                               
8. Frost, Biocultural Creatures, 7. 
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multi-dimensional ecologies or networks.10 Furthermore, 
its action occurs within an assemblage having social, 
material, and technological features, that permit or 
preclude, expedite or delay, that activity. 
Due to time limitations, I’m going mention one 
dimension: technology (a term I’m using very broadly). 
As Don Ihde suggests, routine interactions occur 
through technical objects and against a technological 
background.11 Everyday activity is accompanied by a 
nigh-imperceptible skein of artifactuality that, while 
internal to, and transformative of, perception and action, 
rarely manifests as such. Much apparently spontaneous 
action is technologically-scaffolded: a function not 
simply of the body, but of relations with an available 
sympathetic milieu. In such cases, autonomy does not 
preexist, but emerges from these enabling relations with 
nonhuman interactants, which are part of its exercise.12 
                                               
10. Indeed, contemporary genetics suggests that there is no distinctively 
human genetic marker, while the anthropological record increasingly 
indicates that rather than the human coming about thanks to a 
decisive break with nature, there was instead a mingling of species. In 
other words, there is no ‘pure’ modern human. 
11. Don Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990). 
12. This is not to ascribe human autonomy to objects, but to propose that 
other things besides a human must be present for that human to exert 
agency. Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to 
Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Disability and The Inhuman 
7 
While this condition may be ubiquitous, that 
nondisabled bodies benefit from a panoply of ‘assistive 
devices’ goes under-acknowledged. This is because the 
historical elaboration of technological scaffolds for 
activity has been uneven and normatively-patterned: it 
has organised the world around a privileged human 
ideal. Spaces for action are grounded on an ontogenetic 
history of body-technology interactions and practices to 
harmonise relations between bodies and things. Non-
normative bodies, however, have only recently been 
considered during the elaboration of such technologies, 
and even then, only haltingly. If technologies are a 
persistent dimension of the activity of moving bodies, 
for non-normative bodies, one aspect of their being—
that contributes to self-constitution or ontogenesis—is 
consistently unsympathetic. 
This contributes to the ongoing articulation the 
human. Because this deep artefactual background—that 
presupposes certain bodily competencies—recedes as it 
enables, typical bodies enjoy spontaneous activity. They 
look unambiguously human—that is, and able to 
transcend and appropriate their corporeality—even as 
their actions are technologically scaffolded. The 
humanness of non-normative bodies is compromised: 
unable to spontaneously act within the world, they seem 
anchored to bodily exigency, and thus uniquely affected 
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by nonhuman aspects of themselves, and dependent 
upon nonhuman artefacts. 
 
❧ An Inhuman Gaze 
I’ve suggested that where disability is concerned, the 
human is ambiguous: disabled people may warrant 
inclusion within its bounds, yet on its own terms, their 
disability diminishes characteristically human capacities. 
If this understanding structures encounters, it may be 
just as stifling as the dehumanisation with which I 
began.  
Consequently, I’ll say a few things about a positive 
sense of inhuman gaze. First, this would integrate and 
affirm those very dimensions that humanism must 
repudiate as inhuman: the biological, the animal, the 
technological. Furthermore, it would recognise the 
ubiquity of interdependency and the inadequacy of any 
sharp division between autonomy and dependency: if 
there is autonomy, it occurs at the level of systems. 
There is no originary, self-sufficient, complete human 
that fully transcends material exigencies.13 Indeed, it 
might be that disability, with its attendant 
interdependency and technological involvement, is not a 
                                               
13. Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. 
Geoffrey Beardsworth (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
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failure of the humanist ideal, but a more limpid 
manifestation of the condition of bodies in general.14 
Second, once humanness is understood to be 
constituted relationally and across time through the 
accretion of norms, these categories lose their 
organisational normative force. Here, I submit a further 
notion of inhuman as outside or before the human. This 
sees, as it were, not through human eyes, but with an 
inhuman gaze that is not already orientated by—or that 
is, at least, disloyal to—the human. As such, it can better 
discern those processes by which humanness and 
disability acquire form, and the potential that exists for 
transformation of those categories, thereby making these 
available for re-articulation towards a future difference. 
                                               
14. I do not mean that disability does not exist: rather, it is not a property 
of the body in itself, but instead is enacted in the relation of bodies 
and milieus. 
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